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Understanding Monetary
Policy Implementation
Huberto M. Ennis and Todd Keister
O
verthelasttwodecades,centralbanksaroundtheworldhaveadopted
a common approach to monetary policy that involves targeting the
value of a short-term interest rate. In the United States, for example,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announces a rate that it wishes
to prevail in the federal funds market, where commercial banks lend balances
held at the Federal Reserve to each other overnight. Changes in this short-
term interest rate eventually translate into changes in other interest rates in the
economyandtherebyinﬂuencetheoveralllevelofpricesandofrealeconomic
activity.
Once a target interest rate is announced, the problem of implementation
arises: How can a central bank ensure that the relevant market interest rate
stays at or near the chosen target? The Federal Reserve has a variety of tools
available to inﬂuence the behavior of the interest rate in the federal funds
market (called the fed funds rate). In general, the Fed aims to adjust the total
supply of reserve balances so that it equals demand at exactly the target rate
of interest. This process necessarily involves some estimation, since the Fed
does not know the exact demand for reserve balances, nor does it completely
control the supply in the market.
A critical issue in the implementation process, therefore, is the sensitivity
of the market interest rate to unanticipated changes in supply and/or demand.
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those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
or the Federal Reserve System. Ennis is on leave from the Richmond Fed at University
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If small estimation errors lead to large swings in the interest rate, a central
bank will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to effectively implement monetary policy, that is, to
consistently hit the target rate. The degree of sensitivity depends on a variety
offactorsrelatedtothedesignoftheimplementationprocess, suchasthetime
period over which banks are required to hold reserves and the interest rate, if
any, that a central bank pays on reserve balances.
The ability to hit a target interest rate consistently plays a critical role in a
central bank’s communication policy. The overall effectiveness of monetary
policy depends, in part, on individuals’ perceptions of the central bank’s ac-
tions and objectives. If the market interest rate were to deviate consistently
from the central bank’s announced target, individuals might question whether
these deviations simply represent glitches in the implementation process or
whether they instead represent an unannounced change in the stance of mon-
etary policy. Sustained deviations of the average fed funds rate from the
FOMC’s target in August 2007, for example, led some media commentators
to claim that the Fed had engaged in a “stealth easing,” taking actions that
lowered the market interest rate without announcing a change in the ofﬁcial
target.1 Insuchtimes,theabilitytohitatargetinterestrateconsistentlyallows
the central bank to clearly (and credibly) communicate its policy to market
participants.
Under most circumstances, the Fed changes the total supply of reserve
balances available to commercial banks by exchanging government bonds
or other securities for reserves in an open market operation. Occasionally,
the Fed also provides reserves directly to certain banks through its discount
window. In some situations, the Fed has developed other, ad hoc methods
of inﬂuencing the supply and distribution of reserves in the market. For
example, during the recent period of ﬁnancial turmoil, the market’s ability to
smoothly distribute reserves across banks became partially impaired, which
led to signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in the average fed funds rate both during the day
and across days. In December 2007, partly to address these problems, the Fed
introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF), a bimonthly auction of a ﬁxed
quantity of reserve balances to all banks eligible to borrow at the discount
window. In principle, the TAF has increased these banks’ ability to access
reserves directly and, in this way, has helped ease the pressure on the market
to redistribute reserves and avoid abnormal ﬂuctuations in the market rate.
Such operations, of course, need to be managed so as to achieve the ultimate
goal of implementing the chosen target interest rate. Balancing the demand
and supply of reserves is at the very core of this problem.
This article presents a simple analytical framework for understanding the
process of monetary policy implementation and the factors that inﬂuence a
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central bank’s ability to keep the market interest rate close to a target level.
We present this framework graphically, focusing on how various features of
the implementation process affect the sensitivity of the market interest rate to
unanticipated changes in supply or demand. We discuss the current approach
used by the Fed, including the use of reserve maintenance periods to decrease
this sensitivity. We also show how this framework can be used to study a wide
range of issues related to monetary policy implementation.
In 2006, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation that will give the Fed the
authority to pay interest on reserve balances beginning in October 2011.2
We use our simple framework to illustrate how the ability to pay interest on
reserves can be a useful policy tool for a central bank. In particular, we show
how paying interest on reserves can decrease the sensitivity of the market
interest rate to estimation errors and, thus, enable a central bank to better
achieve its desired interest rate.
The model we present uses the basic approach to reserve management
introduced by Poole (1968) and subsequently advanced by many others (see,
for example, Dotsey 1991; Guthrie and Wright 2000; Bartolini, Bertola, and
Prati 2002; and Clouse and Dow 2002). The speciﬁc details of our formaliza-
tion closely follow those in Ennis andWeinberg (2007), after some additional
simpliﬁcations that allow us to conduct all of our analysis graphically. Ennis
and Weinberg (2007) focused on the interplay between daylight credit and
the Fed’s overnight treatment of bank reserves. In this article, we take a more
comprehensiveviewoftheprocessofmonetarypolicyimplementationandwe
investigate several important topics, such as the role of reserve maintenance
periods, which were left unexplored by Ennis and Weinberg (2007).
1. U.S. MONETARY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Banks hold reserve balances in accounts at the Federal Reserve in order to
satisfy reserve requirements and to be able to make interbank payments. Dur-
ing the day, banks can also access funds by obtaining an overdraft from their
reserve accounts at the Fed. The terms by which the Fed provides daylight
credit are one of the factors determining the demand for reserves by banks.
To adjust their reserve holdings, banks can borrow and lend balances in
the fed funds market, which operates weekdays from 9:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.
A bank wanting to decrease its reserve holdings, for example, can do so in this
market by making unsecured, overnight loans to other banks.
The fed funds market plays a crucial role in monetary policy implementa-
tion because this is where the Federal Reserve intervenes to pursue its policy
objectives. The stance of monetary policy is decided by the FOMC, which
2After this article was written, the effective date for the authority to pay interest on reserves
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selects a target for the overnight interest rate prevailing in this market. The
Committee then instructs the Open Market Desk to adjust, via open market
operations, the supply of reserve balances so as to steer the market interest
rate toward the selected target.3
The Desk conducts open market operations largely by arranging repur-
chase agreements (repos) with primary securities dealers in a sealed-bid,
discriminatory price auction. Repos involve using reserve balances to pur-
chase securities with the explicit agreement that the transaction will be
reversed at maturity. Repos usually have overnight maturity, but the Desk
also employs other maturities (for example, two-day and two-week repos are
commonly used). Open market operations are typically conducted early in
the morning when the market for repos is most active.
The new reserves created in an open market operation are deposited in the
participating securities dealers’ bank accounts and, hence, increase the total
supply of reserves in the banking system. In this way, each day the Desk
tries to move the supply of reserve balances as close as possible to the level
that would leave the market-clearing interest rate equal to the target rate. An
essential step in this process is accurately forecasting both aggregate reserve
demand and those changes in the existing supply of reserve balances that are
due to autonomous factors beyond the Fed’s control, such as payments into
and out of the Treasury’s account and changes in the quantity of currency in
circulation. Forecasting errors will lead the actual supply of reserve balances
to deviate from the intended level and, hence, will cause the market rate to
diverge from the target rate, even if reserve demand is perfectly anticipated.
Reserve requirements in the United States are calculated as a proportion
of the quantity of transaction deposits on a bank’s balance sheet during a two-
week computation period prior to the start of the maintenance period. These
requirements can be met through a combination of vault cash and reserve
balances held at the Fed. During the two-week reserve maintenance period,
a bank’s end-of-day reserve balances must, on average, equal the reserve
requirement minus the quantity of vault cash held during the computation
period. Reserve requirements make a large portion of the demand for reserve
balancesfairlypredictable,whichsimpliﬁesmonetarypolicyimplementation.
Reservemaintenanceperiodsallowbankstospreadouttheirreservehold-
ings over time without having to scramble for funds to meet a requirement at
the end of each day. However, near the end of the maintenance period, this
averaging effect tends to lose force. On the last day of the period, a bank has
some level of remaining requirement that must be met on that day. This gen-
erates a fairly inelastic demand for reserve balances and makes implementing
a target interest rate more challenging. For this reason, the Fed allows banks
3 See Hilton and Hrung (2007) for a more detailed overview of the Fed’s monetary policy
implementation procedures.H. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 239
holdingexcessordeﬁcientbalancesattheendofamaintenanceperiodtocarry
overthosebalancesandusethemtosatisfyupto4percentoftheirrequirement
in the following period.
Ifabankﬁndsitselfshortofreservesattheendofthemaintenanceperiod,
evenaftertakingintoaccountthecarryoverpossibilities,ithasseveraloptions.
It can try to ﬁnd a counterparty late in the day offering an acceptable interest
rate. However, this may not be feasible because of an aggregate shortage of
reservebalancesorbecauseoftheexistenceoftradingfrictionsinthismarket.
A second alternative is to borrow at the discount window of its corresponding
Federal Reserve Bank.4 The discount window offers collateralized overnight
loans of reserves to banks that have previously pledged appropriate collateral.
Discount window loans are typically charged an interest rate that is 100 basis
points above the target fed funds rate, although changing the size of this gap
is possible and has been used, at times, as a policy instrument. Finally, if
the bank does not have the appropriate collateral or chooses not to borrow
at the discount window for other reasons, it will be charged a penalty fee
proportional to the amount of the shortage.
Currently, banks earn no interest on the reserve balances they hold in
their accounts at the Federal Reserve.5 This situation may soon change: The
Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 allows the Fed to begin
paying interest on reserve balances in October 2011. The Act also includes
provisions that give the Fed more ﬂexibility in determining reserve require-
ments, including the ability to eliminate the requirements altogether. Thus,
this legislation opens the door to potentially substantial changes in the way
theFedimplementsmonetarypolicy. Toevaluatethebestapproachwithinthe
new, broader set of alternatives, it seems useful to develop a simple analytical
framework that is able to address many of the relevant aspects of the problem.
We introduce and discuss such a framework in the sections that follow.
2. THE DEMAND FOR RESERVES
Inthissection, wepresentasimpleframeworkthatisusefulforunderstanding
banks’demandforreserves. Inthisframework,abankholdsreservesprimarily
to satisfy reserve requirements, although other factors, such as the desire to
make interbank payments, may also play a role. Since banks cannot fully
predict the timing of payments, they face uncertainty about the net outﬂows
from their reserve accounts and, therefore, are typically unable to exactly
satisfy their reserve requirements. Instead, they must balance the possibility
4 There are 12 regions and corresponding Reserve Banks in the Federal Reserve System. For
each commercial bank, the corresponding Reserve Bank is determined by the region where the
commercial bank is headquartered.
5 See footnote 2.240 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of holding excess reserve balances—and the associated opportunity cost—
against the possibility of being penalized for a reserve deﬁciency. A bank’s
demand for reserves results from optimally balancing these two concerns.
The Basic Framework
We assume banks are risk-neutral and maximize expected proﬁts. At the
beginning of the day, banks can borrow and lend reserves in a competitive
interbank market. Let R be the quantity of reserves chosen by a bank in
the interbank market. The central bank affects the supply of reserves in this
market by conducting open market operations. Total reserve supply is equal
to the quantity set by the central bank through its operations, adjusted by a
potentially random amount to reﬂect unpredictable changes in autonomous
factors.
Duringtheday,eachbankmakespaymentstoandreceivespaymentsfrom
other banks. To keep things as simple as possible, suppose that each bank
will make exactly one payment and receive exactly one payment during the
“middle” part of the day. Furthermore, suppose that these two payment ﬂows
are of exactly the same size, PD > 0, and that this size is nonstochastic. How-
ever, the order in which these payments occur during the day is random; some
banks will receive the incoming payment before making the outgoing one,
while others will make the outgoing payment before receiving the incoming
one.
At the end of the day, after the interbank market has closed, each bank
experiences another payment shock, P, that affects its end-of-day reserve
balance. The value of P can be either positive, indicating a net outﬂow of
funds, or negative, indicating a net inﬂow of funds. We assume that the






a bank’s demand for reserves in this market is affected by the distribution of
the payment shock and not the realization.
We assume, as a starting point, that a bank must meet a given reserve
requirement, K, at the end of each day.6 If the bank ﬁnds itself holding fewer
than K reserves at the end of the day, after the payment shock P has been
realized, it must borrow funds at a “penalty” rate of interest, rP, to satisfy the
requirement. This rate can be thought of as the rate charged by the central
bank on discount window loans, adjusted to take into account any “stigma”
associated with using this facility. In reality, a bank may pay a deﬁciency
fee instead of borrowing from the discount window or it may borrow funds
6 We discuss more complicated systems of reserve requirements later, including multiple-day
maintenance periods. For the logic in the derivations that follow, the particular value of K does
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in the interbank market very late in the day when this market is illiquid. In
the model, the rate rP simply represents the cost associated with a late-day
reserve deﬁciency, whatever the source of that cost may be.
Thespeciﬁcassumptionswemakeaboutthenumberandsizeofpayments
that a bank sends are not important; they only serve to keep the analysis free
of unnecessary complications. Two basic features of the model are important.
First, the bank cannot perfectly anticipate its end-of-day reserve position.
This uncertainty creates a “precautionary” demand for reserves that smoothly
responds to changes in the interest rate. Second, a bank makes payments
during the day as a part of its normal operations and the pattern of these
payments can potentially lead to an overdraft in the bank’s reserve account.
Weinitiallyassumethatthecentralbankoffersdaylightcredittobankstocover
such overdrafts at no charge. We study the case where daylight overdrafts are
costly later in this section.
The Benchmark Case
We begin by analyzing a simple benchmark case; we show later in this section
how the framework can be extended to include a variety of features that are
important in reality. In the benchmark case, banks must meet their reserve
requirement at the end of each day, and the central bank pays no interest
on reserves held by banks overnight. Furthermore, the central bank offers
daylight credit free of charge.
Figure1depictsanindividualbank’sdemandforreservesintheinterbank
marketunderthisbenchmarkscenario. Onthehorizontalaxiswemeasurethe
bank’s choice of reserve holdings before the late-day payment is realized.O n
the vertical axis we measure the market interest rate for overnight loans. To
draw the demand curve, we ask: Given a particular value for the interest rate,
what quantity of reserves would the bank demand to hold if that rate prevailed
in the market?
A bank would be unwilling to hold any reserves if the market interest rate
were higher than rP. If the market rate were higher than the penalty rate,
the bank would choose to meet its requirement entirely by borrowing from
the discount window. It would actually like to borrow even more than its
requirement and lend the rest out at the higher market rate, but this fact is not
important for the analysis. The important point is simply that there will be no
demand for (nonborrowed) reserves for any interest rate larger than rP.
When the market interest rate exactly equals the penalty rate, rP, a bank
would be indifferent between holding any amount of reserves between zero
and K − P and, hence, the demand curve is horizontal at rP. As long as
the bank’s reserve holdings, R, are smaller than K − P, the bank will need
to borrow at the discount window to satisfy its reserve requirement, K,e v e n
if the late-day inﬂow of funds into the bank’s reserve account is the largest242 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly










possible value, P.7 The alternative would be to borrow more reserves in the
market to reduce this potential need for discount window lending. Since the
market rate is equal to the penalty rate, both strategies deliver the same level
of proﬁt and the bank is indifferent between them.
For market interest rates below the penalty rate, however, a bank will
choose to hold at least K − P reserves. As discussed above, if the bank held
fewer than K − P reserves it would be certain to need to borrow from the
discount window, which would not be an optimal choice when the market
rate is lower than the discount rate. The bank’s demand for reserves in this
situationcanbedescribedas“precautionary”inthesensethatthebankchooses
itsreserveholdingstobalancethepossibilityoffallingshortoftherequirement
against the possibility of ending up with extra reserves in its account at the
end of the day.
7 To see this, note that even in the best case scenario the bank will ﬁnd itself holding R+P
reserves after the arrival of the late-day payment ﬂow. When R<K− P, the bank’s end-of-day
holdings of reserves is insufﬁcient to satisfy its reserve requirement, K, unless it takes a loan at
the discount window.H. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 243
If the market interest rate were very low—close to zero—the opportunity
cost of holding reserves would be very small. In this case, the bank would
hold enough precautionary reserves so that it is virtually certain that unfore-
seen movements on its balance sheet will not decrease its reserves below the
required level. In other words, the bank will hold K + P reserves in this
case. If the market interest rate were exactly zero, there would be no oppor-
tunity cost of holding reserves. The demand curve is, therefore, ﬂat along the
horizontal axis after K + P.
In between the two extremes, K −P and K +P, the demand for reserves
will vary inversely with the market interest rate measured on the vertical axis;
this portion of the demand curve is represented by the downward-sloping
line in Figure 1. The curve is downward-sloping for two reasons. First,
the market interest rate represents the opportunity cost of holding reserves
overnight. When this rate is lower, ﬁnding itself with excess balances is less
costly for the bank and, hence, the bank is more willing to hold precautionary
balances. Second, when the market rate is lower, the relative cost of having to
access the discount window is larger, which also tends to increase the bank’s
precautionary demand for reserves.
The linearity of the downward-sloping part of the demand curve results
from the assumption that the late-day payment shock is uniformly distributed.
With other probability distributions, the demand curve will be nonlinear, but
its basic shape will remain unchanged. In particular, the points where the
demand curve intersects the penalty rate, rP, and the horizontal axis will be





The Equilibrium Interest Rate
Suppose, for the moment, that there is a single bank in the economy. Then
the demand curve in Figure 1 also represents the total demand for reserves.
Let S denote the total supply of reserves in the interbank market, as jointly
determined by the central bank’s open market operations and autonomous
factors. Then the equilibrium interest rate is determined by the height of the
demand curve at point S. As shown in the diagram, there is a unique level of
reserve supply, ST, that will generate a given target interest rate, rT.
Nowsupposetherearemanybanksintheeconomy, buttheyareallidenti-
calinthattheyhavethesamelevelofrequiredreserves,facethesamepayment
shock, etc. When there are many banks, the total demand for reserves can be
found by simply “adding up” the individual demand curves. For any interest
8 The support of the probability distribution is the set of values of the payment shock that
is assigned positive probability. An explicit formula for the demand curve in the uniform case is
derived in Ennis and Weinberg (2007). If the shock instead had an unbounded distribution, such
as the normal distribution used by Whitesell (2006) and others, the demand curve would asymptote
to the penalty rate and the horizontal axis but never intersect them.244 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
rate r, total demand is simply the sum of the quantity of reserves demanded
by each individual bank.
For presentation purposes, it is useful to look at the average demand for
reserves, that is, the total demand divided by the number of banks. When
all banks are identical, the average demand is exactly equal to the demand
of each individual bank. In other words, in the benchmark case where banks
are identical, the demand curve in Figure 1 also represents the aggregate
demand for reserves, expressed in per-bank terms. The determination of the
equilibrium interest rate then proceeds exactly as in the single-bank case. In
particular, the market-clearing interest rate will be equal to the target rate, rT,
if and only if reserve supply (expressed in per-bank terms) is equal to ST.
Notethatthecentralbankhastwodistinctwaysinwhichitcanpotentially
affectthemarketinterestrate: changingthesupplyofreservesavailableinthe
market and changing (either directly or indirectly) the penalty rate. Suppose,




of reserves unchanged. Both policies would cause the market interest rate
to fall.
Heterogeneity
While the assumption that all banks are identical was useful for simplifying
the presentation above, it is clearly a poor representation of reality in most
economies. The United States, for example, has thousands of banks and other
depository institutions that differ dramatically in size, range of activities, etc.
We now show how the analysis above changes when there is heterogeneity
amongbanksand, inparticular, howthesizedistributionofbanksmightaffect
the aggregate demand for reserves.
Each bank still has a demand curve of the form depicted in Figure 1, but
now these curves can be different from each other because banks may have
differentlevelsofrequiredreserves,facedifferentdistributionsofthepayment
shock, and/or face different penalty rates. These individual demand curves
can be aggregated exactly as before: For any interest rate r, the total demand
for reserves is simply the sum of the quantity of reserves demanded by each
individual bank. The aggregate demand curve, expressed in per-bank terms,
will again be similar to that presented in Figure 1, with the exact shape being
determined by the properties of the various individual demands. If different
banks have different levels of required reserves, for example, the requirement
K intheaggregatedemandcurvewillbeequaltotheaverageoftheindividual
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Our interest here is in studying how bank heterogeneity affects the prop-
erties of this demand curve. We focus on heterogeneity in bank size, which
is particularly relevant in the United States, where there are some very large
banks and thousands of smaller banks. We ask how large banks may differ
from small banks in the context of the simple framework and how the pres-
enceofbothlargeandsmallbanksmightaffectthepropertiesoftheaggregate
demand curve. To simplify the presentation, we study the three possible
dimensions of heterogeneity addressed by the model one at a time. In reality,
of course, the three cases are closely intertwined.
Size of Requirements
Perhaps the most natural way of capturing differences in bank size is by
allowing for heterogeneity in reserve requirements. When requirements are
calculated as a percentage of the deposit base, larger banks will tend to have a
larger level of required reserves in absolute terms. Suppose, then, that banks
have different levels of K, but they face the same late-day payment shock and
thesamepenaltyrateforareservedeﬁciency. Howwouldthesizedistribution
of banks affect the aggregate demand for reserves in this case?
Tobegin,notethatinFigure1theslopeofthedemandcurveisindependent
of the size of the bank’s reserve requirement, K. To see why this is the case,
consider an increase in the value of K. Since both K −P and K +P become
larger numbers, the demand curve in Figure 1 shifts to the right. Notice
that these two points shift exactly the same distance, leaving the slope of the
downward-sloping segment of the demand curve unchanged.
Simple aggregation then shows that the slope of the aggregate demand
curvewillbeindependentofthesizedistributionofbanks. Inotherwords, for
the case of heterogeneity in K, the sensitivity of reserve demand to changes in
the interest rate does not depend at all on whether the economy is comprised
of only large banks or, as in the United States, has a few large banks and very
many small ones.
Addingheterogeneityinreserverequirementsdoesgenerateaninteresting
implication for the distribution of excess reserve holdings across banks. If
large and small banks face similar (effective) penalty rates and are not too
differentintheirexposuretolate-daypaymentuncertainty,thentheframework
suggeststhatallbanksshouldholdsimilarquantitiesofprecautionaryreserves.
In other words, for a given level of the interest rate, the difference between
the chosen reserve balances, R, and the requirement, K, should be similar for
all banks. After the payment shocks are realized, of course, some banks will
end up holding excess reserves and others will end up needing to borrow. On
average, however, a large bank and a small one should ﬁnish the period with
comparable levels of excess reserves. If the banking system is composed of
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banks, then the majority of the excess reserves in the banking system will be
held by small banks, simply because there are so many more of them. Even if
large banks hold the majority of total reserve balances because of their larger
requirements, mostoftheexcess reservebalanceswillbeheldbysmallbanks.
This implication is broadly in line with the data for the United States.
The Penalty Rate
Another way in which small banks might differ from large ones is the penalty
rate they face if they need to borrow to avoid a reserve deﬁciency. To beH. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 247
eligible to borrow at the discount window, for example, a bank must establish
an agreement with its Reserve Bank and post collateral. This ﬁxed cost may
lead some smaller banks to forgo accessing the discount window and instead
borrow at a very high rate in the market (or pay the reserve deﬁciency fee)
when necessary. Smaller banks may also have fewer established relationships
with counterparties in the fed funds market and, as a consequence, may ﬁnd it
moredifﬁculttoborrowatafavorableinterestratelateintheday(seeAshcraft,
McAndrews, and Skeie 2007).
Suppose small banks do face a higher penalty rate, such as the value rS
P
depicted in Figure 2, Panel A, while larger banks face a lower rate, rL
P. The
ﬁgure is drawn as if the two banks have the same level of requirements, but
this is done only to make the comparison between the curves clear. The ﬁgure
shows two immediate implications of this type of heterogeneity. First, at
any given interest rate, small banks will hold a higher level of precautionary
reserves, that is, they will choose a larger reserve balance relative to their
level of required reserves. In the ﬁgure, the smaller bank will hold a quantity
SS while the larger bank holds only SL, even though—in this example—both
face the same requirement and the same uncertainty about their end-of-day
balance. As a result, the distribution of excess reserves in the economy will
tend to be skewed even more heavily toward small banks than the earlier
discussion would suggest.
The second implication shown in Figure 2, Panel A is that the demand
curve for small banks has a steeper slope. In an economy with a large number
of small banks, therefore, the aggregate demand curve will tend to be steeper,
meaning that average reserve balances will be less sensitive to changes in the
market interest rate. Notice that this result obtains even though there are no
costs of reserve management in the model.
Support of the Payment Shock
A third way in which banks potentially differ from each other is in the distri-
bution of the late-day payment shock they face. Figure 2, Panel B depicts two
demandcurves, oneforabankfacingahighervarianceofthisdistributionand
one for a bank facing a lower variance. The ﬁgure shows that having more
uncertainty about the end-of-day reserve position leads to a ﬂatter demand
curve and, hence, a reserve balance that is more responsive to changes in the
interest rate.
In this case, it is not completely clear which curve corresponds better to
large banks and which to small banks. Banks with larger and more complex
operations might be expected to face much larger day-to-day variations in
their payment ﬂows. However, such banks also tend to have sophisticated
reserve management systems in place. As a result, it is not clear whether the
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by a small bank.9 The effect of the size distribution of banks on the shape of
the aggregate demand curve is, therefore, ambiguous in this case.
Daylight Credit Fees
So far, we have proceeded under the assumption that banks are free to hold
negative balances in their reserve accounts during the day and that no fees
are associated with such daylight overdrafts. Most central banks, however,
place some restriction on banks’ access to overdrafts. In many cases, banks
mustpostcollateralatthecentralbankinordertobeallowedtooverdrafttheir
account. The Federal Reserve currently charges an explicit fee for daylight
overdrafts to compensate for credit risk. We now investigate how reserve
demand changes in the basic framework when access to daylight credit is
costly.
Suppose a bank sends its daytime payment, PD, before receiving the in-
coming payment. If PD is larger than R (the bank’s reserve holdings), the
bank’s account will be overdrawn until the offsetting payment arrives. Let
re denote the interest rate the central bank charges on daylight credit, δ de-
note the time period between the two payment ﬂows during the day, and π
denote the probability that a bank sends the outgoing payment before receiv-
ing the incoming one. Then the bank’s expected cost of daylight credit is
πreδ (PD − R). This expression shows that an additional dollar of reserve
holdings will decrease the bank’s expected cost of daylight credit by πreδ.
In this way, the terms at which the central bank offers daylight credit can
inﬂuence the bank’s choice of reserve position.10
Figure 3 depicts a bank’s demand for reserves when daylight credit is
costly (that is, when re > 0). The case studied in Figure 1 (that is, when
re = 0) is included in the ﬁgure for reference. It is still true that there will be
no demand for reserves if the market rate is above the penalty rate rP. The
interest rate measured on the vertical axis is (as in all of our ﬁgures) the rate
for a 24-hour loan. If the market rate were above the penalty rate, a bank
would prefer to lend out all of its reserves at the (high) market rate and satisfy
its requirements by borrowing at the penalty rate. By arranging these loans to
settle at approximately the same time on both days, this plan would have no
9 One possibility is that large banks face a wider support of the shock because of their larger
operations, but face a smaller variance because of economies of scale in reserve management. This
distinction cannot be captured in the ﬁgures here, which are drawn under the assumption that the
distribution of the payment shock is uniform. For other distributions, the variance generally plays
a more important role in the analysis than the support.
10 The treatment of overnight reserves can, in turn, inﬂuence the level of daylight credit usage.
See Ennis and Weinberg (2007) for an investigation of this effect in a closely-related framework.
See, also, the discussion in Keister, Martin, and McAndrews (2008).H. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 249
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effect on the bank’s daylight credit usage and, hence, would generate a pure
proﬁt.
It is also still true that whenever the market rate is below the penalty
rate, the bank will choose to hold at least K − P reserves, since otherwise
it would be certain to need a discount window loan to meet its requirement.
As the ﬁgure shows, the downward-sloping part of the demand curve is ﬂatter
when daylight credit is costly. For any market interest rate below the discount
rate, the bank will choose to hold a higher quantity of reserves because these
reserves now have the added beneﬁt of reducing daylight credit fees.
Rather than decreasing all the way to the horizontal axis as in Figure 1,
the demand curve now becomes ﬂat at the bank’s expected marginal cost of
intraday funds, πreδ. As long as R is smaller than PD, the bank would not be
willing to lend out funds at an interest rate below πreδ, because the expected
increase in daylight credit fees would be more than the interest earned on the
loan. For values of R larger than PD, the bank is holding sufﬁcient reserves to
coverallofitsintradaypaymentsandthedemandcurvedropstothehorizontal
axis.11
11 The analysis here assumes a particular form of daylight credit usage; if an overdraft occurs,
the size of the overdraft is constant over time. Alternative assumptions about the process of daytime
payments would lead to minor changes in the ﬁgure, but the qualitative properties would be largely250 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
As the ﬁgure shows, when daylight credit is costly, the level of reserves
required to implement a given target rate is higher (S2 rather than S1 in the
diagram). In other words, costly daylight credit tends to increase banks’
reserve holdings. The demand curve is also ﬂatter, meaning that reserve
holdings are more sensitive to changes in the interest rate.
3. INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY
One of the key determinants of a central bank’s ability to consistently achieve
itstargetinterestrateistheslopeoftheaggregatedemandcurveforreserves. In
this section, we describe the relationship between this slope and the volatility
of the market interest rate in the basic framework. The next two sections then
discuss policy tools that can be used to limit this volatility.
Whilethecentralbankcanuseopenmarketoperationstoaffectthesupply
of reserves available in the market, it typically cannot completely control this
supply. Payments into and out of the Treasury account, as well as changes in
the amount of cash in circulation, also affect the total supply of reserves. The
central bank can anticipate much of the change in such autonomous factors,
but there will often be signiﬁcant unanticipated changes that cause the total
supply of reserves to be different from what the central bank intended. As
is clear from Figure 1, if the supply of reserves ends up being different from
the intended amount, ST, the market interest rate will deviate from the target
rate, rT.
Figure 4 illustrates the fact that a ﬂatter demand curve for reserves is
associatedwithlessvolatilityinthemarketinterestrate,givenaparticularlevel
of uncertainty associated with autonomous factors. Suppose this uncertainty
implies that, after a given open market operation, the total supply of reserves
will be equal to either S or S  in the ﬁgure. With the steeper (thick) demand
curve, this uncertainty about the supply of reserves leads to a relatively wide
range of uncertainty about the market rate. With the ﬂatter (thin) demand
curve, in contrast, the variation in the market rate is smaller. For this reason,
the slope of the demand curve, and those policies that affect the slope, are
important determinants of the observed degree of volatility of the market
interest rate around the target.
As discussed in the previous section, a variety of factors affect the slope
oftheaggregatedemandforreserves. Figure4canbeviewed, forexample, as
comparingasituationwhereallbanksfacerelativelylittlelate-dayuncertainty
with one where all banks face more uncertainty; the latter case corresponds
unaffected. The analysis also takes the size and timing of payments as given. Several papers have
studied the interesting question of how banks respond to incentives in choosing the timing of their
outgoing payments and, hence, their daylight credit usage. See, for example, McAndrews and
Rajan (2000) and Bech and Garratt (2003).H. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 251














to the thin line in the ﬁgure. However, it should be clear that the reasoning
presented above does not depend on this particular interpretation. The exact
sameresultsaboutinterestratevolatilitywouldobtainifthedemandcurveshad
differentslopesbecausebanksfacedifferentpenaltyratesinthetwoscenarios
or because of some other factor(s). What the ﬁgure shows is that there is a
direct relationship between the slope of the demand curve and the amount of
interestratevolatilitycausedbyforecasterrorsorotherunanticipatedchanges
in the supply of reserves.
Centralbanksgenerallyaimtolimitthevolatilityoftheinterestratearound
their target level to the extent possible. For this reason, a variety of policy
arrangements have been designed in an attempt to decrease the slope of the
demand curve, at least in the region that is considered “relevant.” In the
remainder of the article, we show how some of these tools can be analyzed
in the context of our simple framework. In Section 4 we discuss reserve
maintenance periods, while in Section 5 we discuss approaches that become
feasible when the central bank pays interest on reserves.
4. RESERVE MAINTENANCE PERIODS
Perhapsthemostsigniﬁcantarrangementdesignedtoﬂattenthedemandcurve
for reserves is the introduction of reserve maintenance periods. In a system252 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
with a reserve maintenance period, banks are not required to hold a particular
quantity of reserves each day. Rather, each bank is required to hold a certain
average level of reserves over the maintenance period. In the United States,
the length of the maintenance period is currently two weeks.
Thepresenceofareservemaintenanceperiodgivesbankssomeﬂexibility
in determining when they hold reserves to meet their requirement. In general,
banks will try to hold more reserves on days in which they expect the market
interest rate to be lower and fewer reserves on days when they expect the rate
tobehigher. Thisﬂexibilityimpliesthatabank’sreserveholdingswilltendto
be more responsive to changes in the interest rate on any given day. In other
words, having a reserve maintenance period tends to make the demand curve
ﬂatter, at least on days prior to the last day of the maintenance period. We
illustrate this effect by studying a two-day maintenance period in the context
of the simple framework. We then brieﬂy explain how the same logic applies
to longer periods.
A Two-Day Maintenance Period
Let K denote the average daily requirement so that the total requirement for
the two-day maintenance period is 2K. The derivation of the demand curve
for reserves on the second (and ﬁnal) day of the maintenance period follows
exactly the same logic as in our benchmark case. The only difference with
Figure1isthatthereserverequirementwillbegivenbytheamountofreserves
that the bank has left to hold in order to satisfy the requirement for the period.
In other words, the reserve requirement on the second day is equal to 2K
minus the quantity of reserves the bank held at the end of the ﬁrst day.
On the ﬁrst day of the maintenance period, a bank’s demand for reserves
dependscruciallyonitsbeliefaboutwhatthemarketinterestratewillbeonthe
second day. Suppose the bank expects the market interest rate on the second
daytoequalthetargetrate,rT. Figure5depictsthedemandforreservesonthe
ﬁrst day under this assumption.12 As in the basic case presented in Figure 1,
there would be no demand for reserves if the market interest rate were greater
than rP. Suppose instead that the market interest rate on the ﬁrst day is close
to, but smaller than, the penalty rate, rP. Then the bank will want to satisfy as
muchofitsreserverequirementaspossibleonthesecondday, whenitexpects
the rate to be substantially lower. However, if the bank’s reserve balance after
thelate-daypaymentshockisnegative, itwillbeforcedtoborrowfundsatthe
penalty rate to avoid incurring an overnight overdraft. As long as the market
rateisbelowthepenaltyrate,thebankwillchooseareservepositionofatleast
−P. Note that this reserve position represents the amount of reserves held by
12 For simplicity, Figure 5 is drawn with no discounting on the part of the bank. The effect
of discounting is very small and inessential for understanding the basic logic described here.H. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 253









negative, as would be the case when the market rate is close to rP in Figure 5,
it is still possible that the bank will receive a late-day inﬂow of reserves such
that it does not need to borrow funds at the penalty rate to avoid an overnight
overdraft. However, if the bank were to choose a position smaller than −P,
it would be certain to need to borrow at the penalty rate, which cannot be an
optimal choice as long as the market rate is lower.
ForinterestratesbelowrP,butstilllargerthanthetargetrate,thebankwill
choose to hold some “precautionary” reserves to decrease the probability that
it will need to borrow at the penalty rate. This precautionary motive generates
the ﬁrst downward-sloping part of the demand curve in the ﬁgure. As long
as the day-one interest rate is above the target rate, however, the bank will
not hold more than P in reserves on the ﬁrst day. By holding P, the bank is
assured that it will have a positive reserve balance after the late-day payment
shock. If the bank were holding more than P on the ﬁrst day, it could lend
those reserves out at the (relatively high) market rate and meet its requirement
by borrowing reserves on the second day in the event that the interest rate is
expected to be at the (lower) target rate, yielding a positive proﬁt. Hence, the
ﬁrst downward-sloping part of the demand curve must end at P.
Now suppose the ﬁrst-day interest rate is exactly equal to the target rate,
rT. In this case, the bank expects the rate to be the same on both days and is,254 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
therefore, indifferent between holding reserves on either day for the purpose
ofmeetingreserverequirements. Inchoosingitsﬁrst-dayreserveposition,the
bank will consider the following issues. It will choose to hold at least enough
reserves to ensure that it will not need to borrow at the penalty rate at the end
of the ﬁrst day. In other words, reserve holdings will be at least as large as the
largest possible payment P.
The bank is willing to hold more reserves than P for the purpose of
satisfying some of its requirement. However, it wants to avoid the possi-
bility of over-satisfying the requirement on the ﬁrst day (that is, becoming
“locked-in”), since it must hold a non-negative quantity of reserves on the
second day to avoid an overnight overdraft. This implies that the bank will
not be willing to hold more than the total requirement, 2K, minus the largest
possiblepaymentinﬂow, P, ontheﬁrstday. Thedemandcurveisﬂatbetween
thesetwopoints(thatis, P and2K−P), indicatingthatthebankisindifferent
between the various levels of reserves in this interval.
Finally, supposethemarketinterestrateontheﬁrstdayissmallerthanthe
target rate. Then the bank wants to satisfy most of the requirement on the ﬁrst
day,sinceitexpectsthemarketratetobehigher onthesecondday. Inthiscase,
the bank will hold at least 2K −P reserves on the ﬁrst day. If it held any less
than this amount, it would be certain to have some requirement remaining on
the second day, which would not be an optimal choice given that the rate will
behigheronthesecondday. Astheinterestratemovesfartherbelowthetarget
rate, the bank will hold more reserves for the usual precautionary reasons. In
this case, the bank is balancing the possibility of being locked-in after the
ﬁrst day against the possibility of needing to meet some of its requirement on
the more-expensive second day. The larger the difference between the rates
on the two days, the larger the quantity the bank will choose to hold on the
ﬁrst day. This trade-off generates the second downward-sloping part of the
demand curve.
The intermediate ﬂat portion of the demand curve in Figure 5 can help
to reduce the volatility of the interest rate on days prior to the settlement
day. As long as movements in autonomous factors are small enough such that
the supply of reserves stays in this portion of the demand curve, interest rate
ﬂuctuationswillbeminimal. Foracentralbankthatisinterestedinminimizing
volatility around its target rate, this represents a substantial improvement over
the situation depicted in Figure 1.13
13 It should be noted that Figure 5 is drawn under the assumption that the reserve requirement
is relatively large. Speciﬁcally, K>P is assumed to hold, so that the total reserve requirement for
the period, 2K, is larger than the width of the support of the late-day payment shock, 2P. If this
inequality were reserved, the ﬂat portion of the demand curve would not exist. In general, reserve
maintenance periods are most useful as a policy tool when the underlying reserve requirements
are sufﬁciently large relative to the end-of-day balance uncertainty.H. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 255
There are, however, some issues that make implementing the target rate
through reserve maintenance periods more difﬁcult than a simple interpreta-
tion of Figure 5 might suggest. First, the position of the ﬂat portion of the
demandcurveattheexactlevelofthetargetratedependsonthecentralbank’s
ability to hit the target rate (on average) on settlement day. If banks expected
thesettlement-dayinterestratetobelowerthanthecurrenttarget,forexample,
the ﬂat portion of the ﬁrst-day demand curve would also lie below the target.
Thisissueisparticularlyproblematicwhenmarketparticipantsexpectthecen-
tral bank’s target rate to change during the course of a reserve maintenance
period. A second difﬁculty is that the ﬂat portion of the demand curve disap-
pears on the settlement day and the curve reverts to that in Figure 1.14 This
feature of the model indicates why market interest rates are likely to be more
volatile on settlement days.
Multiple-Day Maintenance Periods
Maintenance periods with three or more days can be easily analyzed in a
similar way. Consider, for example, the case of a three-day maintenance
period with an average daily requirement equal to K.As before, suppose that
the central bank is expected to hit the target rate on the subsequent days of the
maintenanceperiodandconsiderthedemandforreservesontheﬁrstday. This
demand will be ﬂat between the points P and 3K − P. That is, the demand
curve will be similar to that plotted in Figure 5, but the ﬂat portion will be
wider.
To determine the shape of the demand curve for reserves on the second
day we need to know how many reserves the bank held on the ﬁrst day of
the maintenance period. Suppose the bank held R1 reserves with R1 < 3K.
Then on the second day of the maintenance period, the demand curve for
reserves would be ﬂat between the points P and 3K −R1−P. Hence, we see
that as the bank approaches the ﬁnal day of the maintenance period, the ﬂat
portionofitsdemandcurveislikelytobecomesmaller,potentiallyopeningthe
door to increases in interest rate volatility. For the interested reader, Bartolini,
Bertola, andPrati(2002)provideamorethoroughanalysisoftheimplications
of multiple-day maintenance periods on the behavior of the overnight market
interest rate using a model similar to, but more general than, ours.
14 In practice, central banks often use carryover provisions in an attempt to generate a small
ﬂat region in the demand curve on a settlement day. Another alternative would be to stagger the
reserve maintenance periods for different groups of banks. This idea goes back to as early as the
1960s (see, for example, the discussion between Sternlight 1964 and Cox and Leach 1964 in the
Journal of Finance). One common argument against staggering the periods is that it could make
the task of predicting reserve demand more difﬁcult. Whether the beneﬁts of reducing settlement
day variability outweigh the potential costs of staggering is difﬁcult to determine.256 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
5. PAYING INTEREST ON RESERVES
We now introduce the possibility that the central bank pays interest on the




an additional policy tool that can be used to help minimize the volatility of
the market interest rate and steer this rate to the target level. This tool can be
especially useful during periods of ﬁnancial distress. For example, during the
recentﬁnancialturmoil,thefedfundsratehasexperiencedincreasedvolatility
during the day and has, in many cases, collapsed to values near zero late in
the day. As we will see below, the ability to pay interest on reserves allows
the central bank to effectively put a ﬂoor on the values of the interest rate that
can be observed in the market. Such a ﬂoor reduces volatility and potentially
increases the ability of the central bank to achieve its target rate.
In this section, we describe two approaches to monetary policy imple-
mentation that rely on paying interest on reserves: an interest rate corridor
and a system with clearing bands. We explain the basic components of each
approach and how each tends to ﬂatten the demand curve for reserves.
Interest Rate Corridors
One simple policy a central bank could follow would be to pay a ﬁxed interest
rate, rD, on all reserve balances that a bank holds in its account at the central
bank.15 This policy places a ﬂoor on the market interest rate: No bank would
be willing to lend reserves at an interest rate lower than rD, since they could
instead earn rD by simply holding the reserves on deposit at the central bank.
Together, the penalty rate, rP, and the deposit rate, rD, form a “corridor” in
which the market interest rate will remain.16
Figure 6 depicts the demand for reserves under a corridor system. As in
the earlier ﬁgures, there is no demand for reserves if the market interest rate is
higher than the penalty rate, rP. For values of the market interest rate below
rP, a bank will choose to hold at least K − P reserves for exactly the same
15 In practice, reserve balances held to meet requirements are often compensated at a different
rate than those that are held in excess of a bank’s requirement. For the daily process of targeting
the overnight market interest rate, the rate paid on excess reserves is what matters; this is the rate
we denote rD in our analysis.
16A central bank may prefer to use a lending facility that is distinct from its discount window
to form the upper bound of the corridor. Banks may be reluctant to borrow from the discount
window, which serves as a lender of last resort, because they fear that others would interpret this
borrowing as a sign of poor ﬁnancial health. The terms associated with the lending facility could
be designed to minimize this type of stigma effect and, thus, create a more reliable upper bound
on the market interest rate.H. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 257












reason as in Figure 1: if it held a lower level of reserves, it would be certain to
need to borrow at the penalty rate, rP. Also as before, the demand for reserves
is downward-sloping in this region. The big change from Figure 1 is that the
demand curve now becomes ﬂat at the deposit rate. If the market rate were
lower than the deposit rate, a bank’s demand for reserves would be essentially
inﬁnite, as it would try to borrow at the market rate and earn a proﬁt by simply
holding the reserves overnight.
The ﬁgure shows that, regardless of the level of reserve supply, S, the
market interest rate will always stay in the corridor formed by the rates rP
and rD. The width of the corridor, rP −rD, is then a policy choice. Choosing
a relatively narrow corridor will clearly limit the range and volatility of the
market interest rate. Note that narrowing the corridor also implies that the
downward-slopingpartofthedemandcurvebecomesﬂatter(toseethis,notice
that the boundary points K − P and K + P do not depend on rP or rD).
Hence, the size of the interest rate movement associated with a given shock
to an autonomous factor is smaller, even when the shock is small enough to
keep the rate within the corridor.
An interesting case to consider is one in which the lending and deposit
rates are set the same distance on either side of the target rate (x basis points
above and below the target, respectively). This system is called a symmetric258 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
corridor. A change in policy stance that involves increasing the target rate,
then, effectively amounts to changing the levels of the lending and deposit
rates, which shifts the demand curve along with them. The supply of reserves
needed to maintain a higher target rate, for example, may not be lower. In
fact—perhapssurprisingly—inthesimplemodelstudiedhere, thetargetlevel
ofthesupplyofreserveswouldnotchangeatallwhenthepolicyratechanges.
If the demand curve in Figure 6 is too steep to allow the central bank to
effectively achieve its goal of keeping the market rate close to the target, a
corridor system could be combined with a reserve maintenance period of the
type described in Section 4. The presence of a reserve maintenance period
wouldgenerateaﬂatregioninthedemandcurveasinFigure5. Thefeaturesof
thecorridorwouldmakethetwodownward-slopingpartsofthedemandcurve
in Figure 5 less steep, which would limit the interest rate volatility associated
with events where reserve supply exits the ﬂat region of the demand curve, as
well as on the last day of the maintenance period when the ﬂat region is not
present.
Anotherwaytolimitinterestratevolatilityisforthecentralbanktosetthe
deposit rate equal to the target rate and then provide enough reserves to make
the supply, ST, intersect the demand curve well into the ﬂat portion of the
demand curve at rate rD. This “ﬂoor system” has been recently advocated as a
waytosimplifymonetarypolicyimplementation(see, forexample,Woodford
2000, Goodfriend 2002, and Lacker 2006). Note that such a system does
not rely on a reserve maintenance period to generate the ﬂat region of the
demand curve, nor does it rely on reserve requirements to induce banks to
hold reserves. To the extent that reserve requirements, and the associated
reporting procedures, place signiﬁcant administrative burdens on both banks
and the central bank, setting the ﬂoor of the corridor at the target rate and
simplifying, or even eliminating, reserve requirements could potentially be an
attractive system for monetary policy implementation.
It should be noted, however, that the market interest rate will always
remain some distance above the ﬂoor in such a system, since lenders in the
market must be compensated for transactions costs and for assuming some
counterparty credit risk. In other words, in a ﬂoor system the central bank is
able to fully control the risk-free interest rate, but not necessarily the market
rate. In normal times, the gap between the market rate and the rate paid on
reserves would likely be stable and small. In periods of ﬁnancial distress,
however, elevated credit risk premia may drive the average market interest
rate signiﬁcantly above the interest rate paid on reserves. Our simple model
abstracts from these important considerations.17
17 The central bank could also set an upper limit for the quantity of reserves on which it
would pay the target rate of interest to a bank; reserves above this limit would earn a lower
rate (possibly zero). Whitesell (2006) proposed that banks be allowed to choose their own upperH. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 259
Clearing Bands
Another approach to generating a ﬂat region in the demand curve for re-
serves is the use of daily clearing bands. This approach does not rely on a
reservemaintenanceperiod. Instead,thecentralbankpaysinterestonabank’s
reserve holdings at the target rate, rT, as long as those holdings fall within a
pre-speciﬁed band. Let K and K denote the lower and upper bounds of this
band, respectively. Ifthebank’sreservebalancefallsbelowK, itmustborrow
at the penalty rate, rP, to bring its balance up to at least K. If, on the other
hand, the bank’s reserve balance is higher than K, it will earn the target rate,
rT, on all balances up to K but will earn a lower rate, rE, beyond that bound.
The demand curve for reserves under such a system is depicted in Figure
7. The ﬁgure is drawn under the assumption that the clearing band is fairly
wide relative to the support of the late-day payment shock. In particular, we
assume that K + P<K − P. Let us call the interval
 
K + P,K − P
 
the
“intermediate region” for reserves. By choosing any level of reserves in this
intermediateregion, abankcanensurethatitsend-of-dayreservebalancewill
fall within the clearing band. The bank would then be sure that it will earn the
target rate of interest on all of the reserves it ends up holding overnight.
When the market interest rate is equal to the target rate, rT, a bank is
indifferent between choosing any level of reserves in the intermediate region.
For example, if the bank borrows in the market to slightly increase its reserve
holdings,thecostitwouldpayinthemarketforthosereserveswouldbeexactly
offset by the extra interest it would earn from the central bank. Similarly,
lending out reserves to slightly decrease the bank’s holdings would also leave
proﬁt unchanged. This reasoning shows that the demand curve for reserves
will be ﬂat in the intermediate region between K +P and K −P. As long as
the central bank is able to keep the supply of reserves within this region, the
market interest rate will equal the target rate, rT, regardless of the exact level
of reserve supply.
Outside the intermediate region, the logic behind the shape of the demand
curveisverysimilartothatexplainedinourbenchmarkcase. Whenthemarket
interest rate is higher than rT, a bank can earn more by lending reserves in
the market than by holding them on deposit at the central bank. It would,
therefore, prefer not to hold more than the minimum level of reserves needed
to avoid being penalized, K. Of course, the bank would be willing to hold
some precautionary reserves to guard against the possibility that the late-
day payment shock will drive their reserve balance below K. The quantity of
precautionaryreservesitwouldchoosetoholdis,asbefore,aninversefunction
ofthemarketinterestrate; thisreasoninggeneratestheﬁrstdownward-sloping
part of the demand curve in Figure 7.
limits by paying a facility fee per unit of capacity. Such an approach leads to a demand curve
for reserves that is ﬂat at the target rate over a wide region.260 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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When the market rate is below rT, on the other hand, the bank would like
to take full advantage of its ability to earn the target interest rate by holding
reserves at the central bank. It would, however, take into consideration the
possibility that a late-day inﬂow of funds will leave it with a ﬁnal balance
higher than K, in which case it would earn the lower interest rate, rE, on the
excess funds. The resulting decision process generates a downward-sloping
region of the demand curve between the rates rT and rE. As in Figure 6, the
demand curve never falls below the interest rate paid on excess reserves (now
labeled rE); thus, this rate creates a ﬂoor for the market interest rate.
The demand curve in Figure 7 has the same basic shape as the one gen-
erated by a reserve maintenance period, which was depicted in Figure 5. It is
important to keep in mind, however, that the forces generating the ﬂat portion
of the demand curve in the intermediate region are fundamentally different in
the two cases. The reserve maintenance period approach relies on intertem-
poral arbitrage: banks will want to hold more reserves on days when the
market interest rate is low and fewer reserves when the market rate is high.
Thisactivitywilltendtoequatethecurrentmarketinterestratetotheexpected
future rate (as long as the supply of reserves is in the intermediate region).
The clearing band system relies instead on intraday arbitrage to generate the
ﬂat portion of the demand curve: banks will want to hold more reserves whenH. M. Ennis and T. Keister: Monetary Policy Implementation 261
the market interest rate is low, for example, simply to earn the higher interest
rate paid by the central bank.
The intertemporal aspect of reserve maintenance periods has two clear
drawbacks. First, if—for whatever reason—the expected future rate differs
from the target rate, rT, it becomes difﬁcult for the central bank to achieve the
targetrateinthecurrentperiod. Second, largeshockstothesupplyofreserves
on one day can have spillover effects on subsequent days in the maintenance
period. If,forexample,thesupplyofreservesisunusuallyhighoneday,banks
will satisfy an unusually large portion of their reserve requirements and, as a
result, the ﬂat portion of the demand curve will be smaller on all subsequent
days, increasing the potential for rate volatility on those days.
The clearing band approach, in contrast, generates a ﬂat portion in the
demand curve that always lies at the current target interest rate, even if market
participants expect the target rate to change in the near future. Moreover,
the width of the ﬂat portion is “reset” every day; it does not depend on past
events. Thesefeaturesareimportantpotentialadvantagesoftheclearingband
approach. We should again point out, however, that our simple model has
abstracted from transaction costs and credit risk. As with the ﬂoor system dis-
cussed above, these considerations could result in the average market interest
rate being higher than the rate rT, as the latter represents a risk-free rate.
6. CONCLUSION
ArecentchangeinlegislationthatallowstheFederalReservetopayintereston
reserves has renewed interest in the debate over the most effective way to im-
plement monetary policy. In this article, we have provided a basic framework
that can be useful for analyzing the main properties of the various alterna-
tives. While we have conducted all our analysis graphically, our simplifying
assumptions permit a fairly precise description of the alternatives and their
effectiveness at implementing a target interest rate.
Many extensions of our basic framework are possible and we have ana-
lyzed several of them in this article. However, some important issues remain
unexplored. For example, we only brieﬂy mentioned the difﬁculties that ﬂuc-
tuations in aggregate credit risk can introduce in the implementation process.
Also, as the debate continues, new questions will arise. We believe that the
framework introduced in this article can be a useful ﬁrst step in the search for
much-needed answers.262 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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